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0. Introduction
It is a common presupposition of much philosophical work, both past and present, that in the
study of normativity there are at least two distinct domains to investigate: practical reason and
theoretical reason. The former is principally concerned with actions and certain mental states
relating to actions, and the la+er is principally concerned with beliefs and other doxastic states. 
The history of this division of the study of normativity dates back at least to Aristotle, and I
conjecture that it has been importantly reenforced in contemporary thinking by the programmatic
division of the study of practical and theoretical reason by Kant into two separate Critiques.¹ In
current writings, the practical/theoretical divide is not only accepted as a general organising
principle, but it is commonly thought to reflect a philosophically consequential diﬀerence in
normative kind. 
One of the main upshots of the distinction in current writings is that theoretical normativity is
claimed generally to arise from or to track considerations of truth, quite independent of any
substantive theorising about the nature or sources of practical normativity. This may be thought of
as the alethic thesis about theoretical reason. Those same philosophers have varying views about the
source of practical normativity, but the usual candidates include morality, prudence, and goodness
simplicter.  
Many philosophers who accept the alethic thesis and who think that morality, prudence and
goodness are the source of practical normativity believe that there is a genuine diﬀerence in
normative kind between the domains of theoretical normativity and practical normativity. Yet it is
¹ Kant (2002) and Kant (1999).
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not entirely clear what it is for there to be a genuine diﬀerence in kind between the diﬀerent
domains of normativity.² Both domains are commonly thought to include shared normative
entities, such as reasons and oughts. Failures to comply with oughts from either domain are seen as
being more significant than failures associated with breaches of etique+e or social convention. To
put the point as a question, is there a genuine diﬀerence between the domain of practical
normativity and the domain of theoretical normativity, or is it merely convenient to group reasons
and oughts by whether they concern action propositions or belief propositions?³
This chapter oﬀers some tentative thoughts about what it is to treat diﬀerent domains of
normativity as reflecting deep diﬀerences in normative kind, as opposed to as distinctions of
(significant) philosophical convenience. My suggestion is that there are two ways to understand the
claim that there are diﬀerent domains of normativity as reflecting deep diﬀerences in normative
kind. The first is by considering stances on the question of whether there can be unresolvable
conflicts between domain-specific final oughts. The second is by considering the relation of types
of reasons (e.g. for action, belief, feelings, etc) to their sources.
This chapter explores both approaches and explains how they are diﬀerent. In doing so, it
oﬀers some reflections on constraints on theory choice, and how to address the diversity of
constraints that arise from diﬀerent theoretical starting points. The overall aim of the chapter is to
be+er understand the connections and diﬀerences between two seemingly linked ways of
understanding what it is, or would be, for there to be genuinely distinct normative domains.
1. The ought view
One answer to the question of what it means for there to be genuinely distinct domains of
normativity is to say that there are domain specific final oughts. This is the ought view. The ought
view has a weaker and stronger version:
² This is a question which has been explored interestingly in Skorupski (2009).
³ Or if you prefer, action types and beliefs. 
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The weak ought view (WOV): There is a final ought for each genuinely distinct domain 
of normativity. Additionally, there is a non-domain specific all things considered 
ought.
The strong ought view (SOV): There is a final ought for each genuinely distinct domain 
of normativity. There is no additional non-domain specific all things considered ought.
SOV and WOV invoke some terminology that is technical rather than entirely natural. The
remainder of this section sets out the notions of final ought and all things considered ought, and also
oﬀers some remarks about why it is terminologically disadvantageous to replace 'ought' with 'most
reason'. It concludes more substantively with an explanation of why SOV is more suitable as an
account of what it is for there to be genuinely distinct domains of normativity than WOV. 
1.1 Final and non-final oughts
'Ought' is the name I use to pick out the final normative operator as a concept and as a
property. It is a name that used to be commonly in use in philosophy for this concept and for
correlative property, but it has been displaced to some degree by locutions containing the word
'reason': for example 'most reason'.⁴
There are various possible ways of understanding the notion of a final ought. At minimum, a
final ought is one that is verdictive within its domain. Within the domain of practical reason, if one
finally ought to φ, then the totality of normatively relevant considerations determine that one
ought to φ. One could specify domains more or less finely. For example, one might want to treat
⁴ See §1.3 for more discussion.
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morality as a domain and prudence as a domain, in which case there would be final oughts for
each.
Final oughts contrast with non-final oughts. Two well known non-final oughts are prima facie
and pro tanto oughts.⁵ The former can be defeated and the la+er outweighed. Perhaps there are
other possible non-final oughts. For our purposes, we should understand non-final oughts as only
being oughts relative to an incomplete body of considerations, ones that jointly underdetermine
what one finally ought to do.
1.2 Oughts: final and all-things-considered
I said in the previous sub-section that final oughts are verdictive within a domain. If there is
only one general domain of normativity, then there is only one final ought. This leaves open the
further question of whether there is a non-domain specific ought, what I shall call an 'all-things-
considered' ought, that is more fundamental than domain specific final oughts when there is more
than one domain of normativity.
The all-things-considered ought, as it is understood here, is an ought about which one can no
longer ask further intelligible ought questions.⁶ As a toy illustration, we can imagine that there are
only two normative domains, practical normativity and theoretical normativity. Suppose that in
the practical domain, one finally ought to cause oneself to believe x. In the theoretical domain, one
finally ought not to believe x. We should take 'cause' as a success verb here. The final practical
ought and the final theoretical ought are not mutually satisfiable. It is intelligible to ask which
ought ought to be satisfied. What one is asking about is what one ought to do⁷ all-things-
⁵ For a detailed discussion, see Reisner (2013).
⁶ This way of pu+ing things is not very precise. It is a priori for the concept of all-things-considered ought that there is no
further ought to appeal to. For the property of being something that one all-things-considered ought to do (with 'do'
understood as a universal verb), it is the ought property that trumps all others, given the complete set of normatively
relevant facts. 
⁷ 'Do here should be understood as a universal verb and not specifically an action verb.
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considered. The all-things-considered ought is final in the sense that it is verdictive, given a
complete body of considerations. It diﬀers from other final oughts in that it is not domain specific.
The diﬀerence between WOV and SOV concerns whether there are distinct domains of
normativity, if there is also an all-things-considered ought.
It is important to emphasise that although one can pick out the concept of all-things-
considered ought by considering whether there are further intelligible ought questions, this does
not suggest that the all-thing-considered ought is determined by weighing or comparing various
domain specific final oughts. It may be that there is a domain independent way of weighing up all
normatively relevant considerations that bypasses domain specific final oughts and arrives directly
at an all-things-considered ought.
1.3 Final ought and most reason⁸
It has become increasingly popular in the literature to replace ought with most reason.⁹
Although one is free to use terms of art as one wishes, there is much to be said against current
practice. There are two ways to think of normative reasons, herea!er just 'reasons'. One is as any
unit of normative currency. The other is as a specific kind of normative entity that diﬀers from
other possible normative entities, such as side-constraints, duties, etc. Diﬀerent problems with
the use of most reason arise for two diﬀerent ways of thinking about reasons.
One way of thinking about reasons is as a specific kind of normative entity that contributes
to final oughts through weighing. On this view, reasons have amongst their properties weights
which can be compared. Accordingly, what there is most reason to do is whatever has the most
weight of reason supporting it.
Understood this way, that there is most reason to do something is not suﬃcient to determine
whether one ought to do it. There are three reasons why. The first is that understood as entities
⁸ Comments from the audience at the Uppsala Higher Seminar in Practical Philosophy were particularly valuable in
the development of this section. Jonas Olson in particular has pressed me to explain why it is advantageous to use
'ought' rather than 'most reason'. See also Broome (forthcoming) for a more extensive discussion of ought and most
reason.
⁹ For a small sampling of examples, see: Dancy (2000), Parfit (2001), and Smith (2013).
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that only contribute to oughts through their weight, reasons may not exhaust all the normatively
relevant considerations. There may be other kinds of normative considerations, for example side-
constraints or normatively basic prima facie oughts, that trump the contribution of reasons in the
total normative calculus.
The second pertains specifically to the domain of belief. As John Skorupski points out,¹⁰ 
there can be most reason in this sense to believe x, but nonetheless that may not be enough reason
to make it the case that one ought to believe x. There may only be slightly stronger reason to 
believe x than to believe not x, in which case one ought to suspend judgement.
The final reason why we should be dubious about replacing ought with most reason, if we take
reasons to be particular kinds of normative entities, is that on some views reasons themselves are
analysed in terms of oughts. John Broome has argued, for example, that reasons are explanations
of oughts.¹¹ Stephen Kearns and Daniel Star have argued that reasons are evidence of oughts.¹²
These analyses, which seem substantive and intelligible, turn out to be circular if the same
property appears both in the analysans and the analysandum.
The other way of thinking about reasons is as a category containing all types of units of
normative currency. On this way of thinking about reasons, we must think of most in a diﬀerent
way. Most cannot specifically be a way of accounting for amounts or weights, as there may be
kinds of reasons (now understood as any sort of normative entity) that do not have weights or
amounts. Brute prima facie oughts or side-constraints will come out as reasons, but they cannot be
weighed and do not have quantities associated with them. Most reason then has nothing to do with
particular kinds of normative entities nor with any particularly natural way of understanding
'most'. 'Most reason', like 'ought', just denotes something that gets a top normative ranking,
however the rankings are constructed. It is therefore preferable to use 'ought' rather than 'most
reason' for the sake of clarity when picking out the concept and correlative property of a final
ought. 
¹⁰ Skorupski (2011).
¹¹ See Broome (2004 & 2013).
¹² This view first appears in Kearns and Star (2008).
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1.4 The weak and strong ought views
There are two very general types of comparability questions for a theory of normativity. One is
whether diﬀerent kinds of considerations for the same type of thing (an action, a belief, etc) can be
compared to determine what one ought to do, believe, etc. The other is whether considerations or
verdicts of a putative normative domain can be compared to those in other putative normative
domains. This is the question of whether there is an all-things-considered ought.¹³ 
The ought view tries to capture the distinctness or specialness of diﬀerent domains of
normativity by identifying genuine normative distinctness with domain-relative final oughts. If
the domain-relative final oughts are directly comparable with respect to a verdictive all-things-
considered ought, it suggests that the domains are distinguished at best by being two species of the
same genus. It is unclear what status domain relative final oughts have as final oughts in this case.
They are not at normative rock bo+om. Just how distinct comparable – but at least putatively
diﬀerent – normative domains are may depend on precisely why they are comparable.¹⁴ 
This concern suggests that WOV does less to clarify what it is that makes diﬀerent normative
domains genuinely distinct than does SOV. According to SOV, distinctness amounts to the
incomparability of domain specific final oughts.¹⁵ 
2. Theories and structures
The main work of this chapter is to suggest two diﬀerent ways of understanding the claim that
there is a genuine distinction in kind among diﬀerent domains of normativity. One proposal is
SOV, that what it is for there to be genuinely distinct kinds of normativity is for there to be
fundamentally incomparable final domain specific oughts. Or to put it another way, it is for
¹³ I discuss the diﬀerent types of comparability in detail in Reisner (2004, ch. 3 & 2015).
¹⁴ See Reisner (2015) for more discussion.
¹⁵ In §4 I discuss the reasons matching view, which oﬀers a more specific way of understanding normative distinctness 
that is compatible with the existence of an all-things-considered ought.
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conflicts between domain specific final oughts to be in principle unresolvable. 
SOV is an interesting way of understanding what it is for there to be genuinely distinct
domains of normativity in part because it invites interesting methodological questions about
normative theorising. One may arrive at SOV, or its negation, from two diﬀerent theoretical
directions. SOV or its negation can each be the consequence of particular theories of normativity,
by which I mean accounts of what determines what one ought to do, believe, etc. One may also
arrive at SOV or its negation by considering the nature of ought itself, before one has commi+ed to
a particular normative theory.
This section and the next consider this broad methodological question raised by SOV, namely
how to address theoretical disagreement about whether there are distinct domains of normativity,
when the disagreement arises from arguments about normative theories on one side and about the
nature of ought itself on the other.
Unfortunately, the foregoing discussion is conducted at a high level of abstraction without
much reference to particular authors' views or approaches. I believe that in the present context it is
distracting to engage in the kind of exegesis that would be required to show that particular authors
have adopted one or another of the methodologies discussed here. It is my hope that by se+ing out
these methodological issues in the way that I have, they may prove useful in providing a framework
for philosophers interested in trying to argue in favour of one normative view over another, when
existing arguments for the views themselves depend on quite diﬀerent methodological
assumptions. 
Particular theories of normativity and also particular accounts of the nature of ought may
deliver the conclusion that practical and theoretical normativity are genuinely distinct domains of
normativity. Others may be neutral about whether this is so. Still others may entail that there are
no distinct normative domains. For present purposes we can set aside theories of normativity and
accounts of the nature of ought that are neutral and instead just consider those that entail that
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there is, or alternatively is not, a genuine distinction between practical and theoretical normativity.
I shall call the view that there is such a distinction, 'distinction realism' or just 'realism'. Its opposite
I shall call 'distinction anti-realism' or just 'anti-realism'.
2.1 Theory drivenness and first-orderism
It is possible to argue in favour of distinction realism or anti-realism antecedently to first order
normative theorising. A first order normative theory should be understood as a theory that tells us
about what oughts and reasons there are and how they come about. Realism and anti-realism are
structural claims, and there is o!en the possibility of arguing about structure quite independently
of first order substance. 
If this is so, conclusions about distinction realism or anti-realism, arrived at independently of
first order normative theoretical commitments, may constrain which first order normative theories
are possible. If distinction realism is true, and a particular first order normative theory entails
distinction anti-realism, then that first order normative theory cannot be true.
Yet some proponents of a particular theory of normativity may well resist the thought that
whether their view is correct, much less whether it is in play theoretically, is a ma+er that can be
resolved by high-level independent theorising about distinction realism or anti-realism. This
resistance could be motivated by one of two, perhaps tacit, methodological commitments.
The first commitment is to theory drivenness (TD). To be theory driven in this sense is to think
that there is suﬃciently good support for a particular first order normative theory that we are in a
position to reject other philosophical views that entail the theory's falsehood. More tenably, TD
may require us to reject other philosophical views that entail in one form or another that the
preferred theory is a non-starter. This weaker version of TD would be suﬃcient for rejecting
structural views about normativity in general that entailed the wrong (from the perspective of the
preferred theory) one of realism or anti-realism.
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The second commitment is to first-orderism (FO). FO gives priority in general to arguments that
can be made about first order theories of practical and theoretical normativity, and other relevant
areas of normativity, without appealing to independent considerations about the structure of
normativity itself. FO could be weakened in various ways, but this is a good approximation of the
relevant methodological commitment. 
It may be useful to note that the kind of commitment I have in mind for FO is not strictly
parallel to a common way of understanding debates in normative ethics, to which it bears a
superficial similarity. There is a tradition according to which normative ethics and metaethics are
either completely or to a significant degree independent of each other. FO makes no such
assumption with respect to what might be thought of as the normative and metanormative
domains. It is instead a claim about which domain has priority in se+ing the basic correctness
conditions for the other. Put another way, FO sanctions making inferences about distinction
realism or distinction anti-realism from a first order theory, but it forbids, or at least places a
demanding standard on inferences about the possible correctness of first order normative theories
based on independent arguments for realism or anti-realism.
2.2 Structurism
It is easy enough to construct analogues of TD and FO, in which priority is given to theoretical
considerations in the metanormative domain over those in the normative domain. We may put the
analogous views of both kinds under the heading of 'structurism'. The heading is a useful one,
because it stands as a reminder of an important restriction on which aspects of the metanormative
domain are methodologically salient.
The term 'metanormativity' is sometimes used analogously to 'metaethics'. When it is used in
that way, it names that field of inquiry concerned with the use and meaning of normative language,
the nature of thoughts involving normative concepts, and the nature of normative properties, if
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there are any. In metaethics, commitments about language, thought, and metaphysics can ramify
into normative ethics. Two examples involve the (claimed) derivation of utilitarianism, one from
forms of naturalist realism and the other from cognitive irrealism.¹⁶ It is quite possible that there
are similar strong links between some first order theories of normativity and some metanormative
theorising, in its analogous-to-metaethics guise, but I shall not explore the ma+er here.
Structurism is in principle silent on the relationship between classical metaethics-like
metanormative verdicts and first order normative theories, although it is not my intention to rule
out the possibility of linkages. Structurism picks out a particular feature of metanormative
theorising, namely the metanormative verdicts on the unity or plurality of the final normative
operator, ought.¹⁷ There is a unified final normative operator if there is an all-things-considered
ought. There is a plurality of final normative operators if there are multiple domain specific final
oughts and no all-things-considered ought. A strict structurist would be commi+ed to the view
that independent theoretical verdicts about whether there is one final ought or one for each
domain of normativity would serve as an absolute restriction on first order theoretical theorising. 
If it is on the one hand a necessary consequence of a particular first order normative theory
that there are separate final oughts for each domain, and if it is a consequence on the other hand of
independent theorising about the structure of normativity that there is a single final ought that is
not domain specific, then the first order theory will be treated by the strict structurist as being
excluded.
Structurism, like TD and FO approaches, can be given a slack formulation. In the slack
formulation, structurism is a view about the degree of priority that is given to preserving the
preferred structure when it conflicts with a preferred first order normative theory. Strict
¹⁶ See Railton (1986) and Skorupski (2011).
¹⁷ These verdicts can be of two types: those which concern concepts and those which concern properties. I shall not
carefully distinguish between the two types of verdicts, in order that I may simplify the discussion.
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structurism and strict versions of TD and FO approaches represent opposite ends of a
methodological spectrum, along which diﬀerent relative balances of priority may be assigned.
2.3 Degree of priority for slack methodologies
As a naming convention, we can choose of which approach a particular methodological
commitment is a slack version by looking at whether it assigns more weight to TD and FO
considerations or to structurist ones. The interest of slack approaches is that they oﬀer in principle
a method whereby competing claims from TD and FO considerations can be weighed against
structurist claims. The question of how to formulate slack versions of TD and FO approaches and
of structurism proves tricky on reflection. We may consider first a simple way of construing slack
theory-first or slack stucturist methodologies and then a more complicated way of doing so. 
Compare three distributive principles, the principle of utility, maximin, and the weighted telic
inequality principle. We may think of the spectrum of views as having for one pole a principle, the
principle of utility, that gives no priority to reducing inequality and gives absolute priority to
maximising (expected) wellbeing. The opposite pole is given by individualistic maximin.
Individualistic maximin gives absolute priority to improving the wellbeing of the worst oﬀ person.
The weighted telic inequality principle gives greater priority to identical improvements in total
wellbeing if they are concentrated in the relatively worst oﬀ.¹⁸ However, it allows that a less equal
distribution with a greater total quantity of wellbeing may be strictly be+er than an alternative
distribution having both less inequality and less total wellbeing. The polar principles – utility and
individualistic maximin – each give total priority to just one feature of a distribution. The
weighted telic inequailty principle is slack, because it assigns relative weights to utility and
inequality.
¹⁸ For a more detailed discussion of priority in the context of telic egalitarianism, classical utilitarianism, and Rawls's
distributive principles (including maximin), see Hirose, 2015.
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There appears to be no strong analogue to utility and priority to the worst oﬀ for TD/FO and
structurist approaches. This is because the influence of supports for diﬀerent kinds of theories is
being weighed up, rather than features within a single, for example, aggregative theory. 
Alternatives to the straightforward approach may involve multiple steps. Here I sketch a simple
multi-step slack methodology: amplification. Amplification requires a two step weighing process.
The first step assigns a degree of support to the preferred first-order theory and to the preferred
structurist theory. By 'preferred theory', I mean in each case that it is the most strongly supported
theory of its type (either a first order normative theory or an account of the nature of ought).¹⁹ The
second step is to apply a coeﬃcient that amplifies or diminishes the individual degrees of support
for final comparison between the first order theory and the stuctural theory. A restriction on the
second step is that the amplification and a+enuation should be complementary.
There are many other possible alternatives, but amplification is a convenient model for
discussion, and I shall refer back to it in §3.
3. The metaproblem
The previous section proceeded at a high level of abstraction, but the main thought is quite
straightforward. Philosophers working on theories of normativity sometimes find argumentative
support for particular first order theories of normativity. Other times, they find argumentative
support for claims about the structure of normativity, for example with respect to its unity or
disunity and whether there can be genuine normative conflicts. One might have convictions about
what to do when the best supported first order theory has structural entailments that conflict with
the best supported theory of the structure of normativity.
Let us introduce the notion of a comprehensive theory of normativity. A comprehensive theory of
¹⁹ Of course, there need not be only one top ranked theory. It may be be+er to talk about non-dominated theories than
top ranked ones. However, this adds complications that are largely orthogonal to my interests here.
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normativity is both a first-order normative theory and a structural theory. Projects trying to work
out such theories have become popular in recent years.²⁰ With varying degrees of explicitness, the
authors argue in such ways as to suggest a preferred methodological balance. The chosen
methodological balance can be philosophically consequential. Independent arguments for
structural unity are seen as having diﬀerent degrees of importance. Assigned enough importance,
they can rule in or rule out competing first-order theories. 
Because the choice of how to balance arguments that support incompatible first-order and
structural views has important theoretical consequences, it would be helpful to be able to say
something about the metaproblem. One way to understand the metaproblem is through the
apparatus of amplification. There, it is the problem of how to assign the amplifiying and
a+enuating coeﬃcients to the initial levels of support for the first-order theory and for the
structure. This metaproblem, like many others, has no obvious general solution. In the remainder
of this section, I shall outline two possible strategies for addressing the metaproblem of how to
prioritise theory-first and structurist considerations.
3.1 Appeals to concepts
One way that conflicts between the entailments of first-order normative theories and various
normative structures might be resolved is by appeal to conceptual analysis or just necessary or
suﬃcient conditions for certain concepts, when a full blown analysis is not in the oﬃng. 
Ought is a concept that provides a natural starting point. A!er all, first-order normative
theories are generally concerned to tell us what we ought to do, believe, and feel, and the concept of
ought may prove to have first order entailments as well as structurist ones. I have discussed earlier
²⁰ Parfit (2013a & 2013b), Scanlon (1998 & 2014), and Skorupski (2011) have wri+en large works of this kind. Miriam
McCormick (2015) has also wri+en a book that should be regarded as oﬀering a starting point for a comprehensive
theory of normativity, although the book has as its main focus normative reasons for belief.
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in the chapter how structurists might develop arguments by appealing to the nature of ought.²¹ In
doing so, I was tacitly assuming a picture on which the only available entailments from ought were
structurist. In the present context, the conceptual analysis of ought is expected to yield both
structurist and first order normative entailments. I am not sure which expectation is correct, but
we should assume the la+er for this part of the discussion.
If we had an independent analysis, or a set of necessary or suﬃcient conditions, for ought, then
we might find a solution to the metaproblem at hand. This is because an analysis or weaker
account of ought might have either first-order entailments or structural ones. A notable example of
the former is G.E. Moore's contention that the real definition of ought to do is that action which
maximises good.²² Analytic naturalists have reached a similar conclusion, also for reasons of
analysis.²³ Other philosophers claim to derive structurist conclusions from accounts of ought. I
have suggested this, at least indirectly, at times.²⁴ Recently, the study of ought has regained its
vigour, and there are many examples of accounts that have structurist implications.²⁵ 
It is significant that analyses or accounts of ought do not uniformly deliver first-order or
structurist verdicts exclusively. This makes the adoption of an ought-centric solution to the
metaproblem dialectically fair. If it were a priori that analyses or accounts of ought only delivered
stucturist verdicts, for example, then appealing to those analyses or accounts to solve the
metaproblem could be fairly regarded as just plumping for structurism in the first place.
A second concept that may prove of use is that of being a reason. Much the same can be said
mutatis mutandis about being a reason as can be said of ought in this context. It remains to be seen
²¹ Williams (1973) might be read this way.
²² Moore (1903).
²³ Most famously J.J.C. Smart (1956).
²⁴ See Reisner (2015 & forthcoming).
²⁵ A sampling of some recent accounts includes Broome, (2013); Cariani (2013), Kolodny and Macfarlane (2010);
Wedgwood (2009); and Zimmerman (2007 & 2015). Broome also thinks that there are first-order consequences to the
analysis of ought. See Broome (ibid. ch. 1). 
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whether one or the other is more perspicuous for the purpose at hand. 
3.2 Systematic metanormativity
There is disagreement amongst philosophers about the degree of independence exhibited by
metaethical theories from normative ethical theories. One approach would be to (aim to) derive a
normative ethical theory from a metaethical theory, and the other would be to make one's
metaethical theory consistent with a (suitably) wide range of normative ethical theories.
The analogue of both approaches to giving a theory of systematic metanormativity can be
dialectically neutral with respect to dispute between first-orderism and structurism. There are two
important constraints. The first constraint avoids hidden structurism. It applies to approaches that
do not entangle the first-order theory with the metatheory. For those approaches, it is important
that the metatheory neither assumes a substantive structurist outcome as a desideratum nor uses
the production of a particular substantive structurist outcome as evidence for the correctness of
the theory. To do so would be to smuggle in structurism.
The second constraint applies to approaches that entangle the first order normative theory and
the metanormative theory. For these approaches, there is a ban on se+ing a substantive first-order
theory as a desideratum for a successful metanormative theory, and there is a concomitant ban on
appealing to the first-order theory entailed by the metaetheory as evidence for the metatheory
itself. An example in metaethics elucidates the point. Let us suppose that Kantian metaethics
entail Kantian normative ethics. That Kantian normative ethics are claimed to be correct is
sometimes adduced as a consideration in favour of Kantian metaethics. In the context of trying to
solve the metaproblem, analogous adductions are ruled out.
3.3 Some remarks about the two strategies 
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An interesting feature of both strategies is that they solve the metaproblem by ignoring it. And
this is not accidentally so. Solutions to the metaproblem can assume neither first-orderism nor
strutcurism. And it is not clear how – beyond assumption or stipulation – disagreements about
weighting in a slack theory could be neutrally resolved.
One general way to avoid assuming one approach or the other is look for a diﬀerent
philosophical method. In this case that method is an appeal either to analysis or to classical
metaethical considerations. These methods are neutral in this context because, if successful, they
deliver both at least a partial first order normative theory and a structure ab initio without a
conflict between the first-order theory and the structure that requires resolution in the first place.
It is reasonable to ask whether these approaches solve the metaproblem in any interesting
sense. It is clear that they do not solve the metaproblem in a strict sense. What they do oﬀer is a
method for neutrally refereeing disagreements between first-order theories and structural claims
by providing an independent way of delivering a comprehensive normative theory. 
4. Reasons and the distinctness of domains of normativity
We now turn to the second way of understanding the claim that there are genuinely distinct
normative domains: to look at the relations between reasons and their sources.
Reasons and oughts share some basic structural features. At least in case of owned oughts,²⁶
both reasons and oughts relate an agent to an action or a mental state. A simple schema of each
relation would look like these:
     
R-schema: Fact f is a reason for agent A to φ.
O-schema: Agent A ought that A [do] φ.²⁷ 
²⁶ See Broome (2013) ch. 2 for a discussion of owned and unowned oughts.
²⁷ The o-schema can be expressed by what I have called 'o-form sentences' elsewhere. See Reisner (2004) and also
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 Reasons diﬀer from oughts in one crucial respect: reasons relate particular facts to agents and
actions in a counting-in-favour-of relation. For example the fact that my coﬀee gets cold too
quickly is a reason for me to switch to using an insulated mug. Oughts do not, at least explicitly,
relate particular facts to those things that one ought to do. The corresponding ought claim is just
that I ought to switch to using an insulated mug.
Yet there are explanations of why we ought to do something. One kind of explanation of an
ought is given by the balance of reasons and other non-final normative considerations. On the
other hand, the explanation of why a particular fact is, for example, a consideration that counts in
favour of doing something – is a reason – is not usually given by way of citing some further balance
of reasons. The explanation instead looks to be something like a principle of normativity or some
other in-favour-of makers. I have called the in-favour-of makers 'sources'.²⁸ The important thought
is that counting-in-favourness does not occur in a vacuum. The counting-in-favour relation is
grounded or explained by something else.
On my view, the explanation is a particular kind of further normative fact, although not one
that is a reason. An example should make things clearer. Suppose Odd asks Even for the time. Let
us suppose that Even's wristwatch, which he believes with good reason to be accurate, says that it is
17:00. The explanation or ground for this reason is that the evidence – the information from Even's
wristwatch – strongly suggests that the time is in fact 17:00. The ground or explanation is
evidential. I shall maintain my past custom and call the category that being evidence for falls under
in this example 'being a source'.²⁹ 
Broome ibid.  
²⁸ See Reisner (2004 & 2015). 
²⁹ Reisner (ibid.). Broome (2013) works out a more detailed account of the relation between reasons and sources.
Guindon (forthcoming) presents an alternative view to Broome's.
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4.1 Matched and unmatched sources for types of reasons³⁰
A theory of reasons comprises many parts. It says something about the structure of reasons,
about how they are compared, about what they are and whether they are fundamental, and about
what gives rise to them. It also divides reasons into types. A type of reason is identified by looking
at what the reason is a reason for. This leaves the grain of the typology of reasons open, pending
more substantive theorising. One might think that all reasons for feelings fall under the single
heading of 'aﬀective reasons', or one might think that there is no general type of reason like an
aﬀective reason, but rather several diﬀerent types individuated as finely as kinds of feelings for
which there can be reasons. I shall be working with a coarse typology in the rest of this chapter for
the sake of convenience.
One can think of types of reasons and their sources as being either matched or unmatched. A
source and a type are matched if there is a particular kind of connection between them. They are
unmatched if no special kind of connection holds between them.³¹ 
It is diﬃcult to say very much that is contentful about the particular or special connection that
must hold for a type of reason and (one of) its source(s) to be matched.³² This is because matching
is typically something that occurs within the context of substantive normative theory. 
As an example, consider an apparatus developed by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson.³³ They
introduce the notion of a correctness reason. That Josefin has been wronged is a reason for her to feel
angry. That Josefin will win a prize for feeling angry is also a reason for her to feel angry. Yet there
is something diﬀerent about these two reasons for Josefin to be angry. It at least seems that there is
something appropriate, correct, or fi+ing about feeling angry when one has been wronged. One
³⁰ This section owes much to comments by Patricia Mindus on an earlier version of this material.
³¹ Hieronymi (2005) suggests that sources and reasons can be matched by considering what question a reason bears on.
Worries about this and other kinds of matching can be found in Reisner (forthcoming).
³² The matched/unmatched distinction is another way of spelling out the reasons specialism/reasons generalism
distinction developed in Reisner (2004 & 2015).
³³ Danielsson and Olson (2007).
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may, at least on some views, still have a reason to be angry when one will get a prize for it, but there
is no question of appropriateness, correctness, or fi+ingness. Anger fits being wronged; it does not
fit receiving a prize for being angry. 
The matching relation is in the background of the very idea of a correctness reason.
Correctness reasons depend on there being something about the a+itude of anger, or the concept of
the a+itude of anger, that makes it correct when one has been wronged in something like the way
that that fact there is snow on the ground makes the belief that there is snow on the ground true.
Reasons for anger are matched to being wronged as a source just as reasons for belief are matched
to truth as a source.³⁴ That Josefin has been wronged is not a correctness reason for her to be glad,
supercilious, or magnanimous. Those a+itudes are not appropriate or are not fi+ing with respect to
being wronged. There is nothing about those a+itudes, or the concepts of them, that matches them
to being wronged as a source of reasons for them. 
This example only provides what I hope is an intuitive illustration of how matching is
supposed to work. Particular types of actions or a+itudes on some views have their own special
sources of reasons. The best known views that posit these relations are constituvist ones.³⁵
However a theory specifies the matching relation, the core idea is that matched source/reason-type
pairs are matched in a way that is in some way special to them. The alternative is for a reason type
and its source to be unmatched.
The matched/unmatched distinction is intended to be exhaustive. Therefore a type of reason
and (one of) its source(s) are unmatched just if they are not matched. It may be useful to consider
an example. Some theories may not assign any special importance to the type of reason when
³⁴ The exact analogy is diﬃcult to work out. Truth is normally thought to be a source of reasons for belief, but those
reasons are, or are given by, evidence for the contents of the belief, rather than by the actual truth of its contents. The
analogous story for correctness reasons is diﬃcult to articulate. For worries about correctness reasons, see Reisner
(2009).
³⁵ For an excellent discussion about constitutivism about reasons, see Kastafanas (forthcoming).
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distinguishing its sources. We can imagine a theoretical view about reasons that says that a
suﬃcient condition for something to be a reason of any type is for it to be a consideration that
speaks to the goodness of that for which it is a reason. That my believing I can speak Swedish
would make me happier and that my drinking a glass of wine would make me happier are reasons
for me respectively to believe that I speak Swedish and to drink a glass of wine. The fact that one
reason is for a belief and the other for an action is neither here nor there according to this view. The
source for each of these reasons is goodness, and it is unmatched because the source bears no
special connection to the reason's being for a belief or for an action per se.
4.2 Matching and distinction realism
The idea of a matching relation between a reason and its source allows us to frame the second
way in which we can understand distinction realism. Here distinction realism would be the view
that there are at least some matched reasons and sources. I shall call this version of the view the
'matching realism view' (MRV).
Turning back to the ought view, we can see that MRV is not equivalent to SOV. MRV does not
have direct implications for whether there is an all-things-considered ought or whether there are
unresolvable normative conflicts between (putative) domains of normativity. MRV does not even
entail that there are domain specific final oughts. 
Understanding why MRV and SOV come apart is easier when one considers the distinctive
emphasis of each account. MRV is a thesis about how reasons arise, not how they aggregate. Not
uncommonly, views about how reasons arise are linked to how they aggregate, but one need not
assume a link. One could adopt the view that there are brute weighing relations amongst reasons of
the same type arising from diﬀerent sources, as one might in weighing pragmatic and evidential
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reasons for belief.³⁶ One might similarly adopt the view that there are brute weighing relations
between reasons for action and reasons for belief when they conflict.³⁷
MRV's silence on aggregation also means that it does not say anything about whether there are
domain specific final oughts. If there are brute weighing relations among diﬀerent types of reasons
or reasons of the same type with diﬀerent sources, it may be that the only genuine final ought is the
all-things-considered ought. In that case, one might still talk loosely of 'domain specific final
oughts', but that would simply be a ma+er of convenience rather than a reflection of a conceptual
or ontological commitment.
Conversely, SOV concerns the aggregated units rather than the units of aggregation. It is silent
on the question of whether there are matched or unmatched reasons, or both. And it is silent on
the more fundamental question of whether there are reasons at all. 
5. Conclusion
MRV and SOV represent, respectively, theory-first and structurist accounts of distinction
realism. MRV sets out a criterion within a normative theory and SOV sets out a criterion for the
structure of relations amongst final oughts. A comprehensive normative theory may meet the
criterion for MRV but not SOV and vice-versa.
This is interesting and in some ways surprising. There is a thesis I have discussed elsewhere,
which I call 'normative separatism'.³⁸ It is the view that there are genuinely distinct and
incomparable domains of normativity with a final ought for each and no more fundamental all-
things-considered ought. It is in content the same as SOV, but it was intended to describe a
theoretical view about the structure of normativity rather than to serve as a criterion for there
³⁶ I discuss how this might be done in Reisner (2008).
³⁷ Such a conflict is described in §1.2.
³⁸ Reisner (2004 & 2015).
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being distinct domains of normativity. When I have discussed normative separatism in the past, I
have suggested that there are reasons to expect it to be linked to what I called in the same places
'normative monism and reasons specialism',³⁹ which is essentially a strong version of MRV. In
parallel, the former was intended as a theoretical position about the relation between reasons and
sources rather than as a criterion for there being genuinely distinct domains of normativity. 
But now it seems that we can understand what it is for there to be a genuinely distinct domains
of normativity in two diﬀerent ways, one structurist and one at the level of normative theory.
Authors like me who discuss the distinctness of theoretical and practical normativity may wish to
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